'Justice requires a fair tribunal, but not necessarily an 'optimal' one."
I. INTRODUCTION
A labor union's duty of fair representation is a staple part of labor law jurisprudence. ' The duty has been well defined by a series of United States Supreme Court decisions. 2 Academic commentary has also been voluminous. 3 One of the best kept secrets in American labor law, however, is that duty of fair representation jurisprudence simply does not work. It does not work for plaintiff union members because they must satisfy a nearly impossible burden of proof 4 and have a very short statute of limitations window to assert their claim. It does not work for defendant unions because they are often forced to file pointless grievances in order to avoid U. S. 192 (1944) .
3.
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 1988 n.4 (citing numerous authorities). Interestingly, there has not been much recent scholarly commentary. 4. In order to prevail in a cause of action alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation, the putative plaintiff has a high wall to climb in that the mere failure to bring a meritorious grievance to arbitration does not establish a cause of action for the breach of a union's duty of fair representation. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191; Air Line Pilots, 499 U.S. 65. For discussion of the applicable standard, see infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text (discussing heightened standard). the cost of litigation. It does not work for defendant employers because they are often brought into these lawsuits simply because they have the "deep pockets." 7 Additionally, under the current system, it is very easy for a putative plaintiff to assert his or her claim. However, plaintiffs rarely prevail. From a public policy standpoint, none of this makes much sense. 8 In order to "fix" this system, this Article posits two proposals. First, it is submitted that duty of fair representation claims should be adjudicated in internal union review tribunals as opposed to courts. The internal union tribunal system, if procedurally and substantively fair, would provide unions with a complete defense to duty of fair representation claims. This would move most duty of fair representation disputes from the ex-post stage (after a court dispute has arisen) to the ex-ante stage (before a court dispute has arisen) .9
5.
Additionally, this Article asserts that the current system needs to be "tweaked" to return to the original intent of Vaca v. Sipes, ' 0 to utilize re-arbitration" as a remedy in duty of fair representation cases. Remarkably, though Vaca expressly stated that "arbitration should be viewed as one of the available remedies when a breach of the union's duty is proved,"'" this aspect of the decision has been virtually ignored by commentators 3 and the
6.
See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (discussing unions' fear of duty of fair representation litigation).
7. An aggrieved employee can sue his employer for breach of contract, his union for breach of the duty of fair representation, or both in a hybrid action commonly referred to as a suit for breach of the duty of fair representation. See DelCosteo, 462 U.S. at 163-66 (discussing nature of cause of action).
8. An employee who feels that he has been treated unfairly by his union can file a charge with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") or he can sue his union, his employer or both in federal or state court under 29 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) . Journeyman Pipe Fitters Local 392 v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 225, 226 (6th Cir. 1983 ); see also Tand v. Solomon Schechter Day Sch., 324 F. Supp. 2d 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2004 ) (permitting state court duty of fair representation action to be removed to federal court).
9. See infra Part IV.A (discussing internal union tribunals in the context of duty of fair representation disputes).
10. 386 U. S. 171 (1967) . Vaca is unquestionably the leading case in duty of fair representation jurisprudence.
11. Throughout this Article, the term "re-arbitration" is used in connection with duty of fair representation remedies where an unfairly represented employee would be entitled to present his or her case to a second arbitrator because the union breached its duty of fair representation in connection with the first arbitration. This term is also used to generically refer to arbitration as a remedy when a union unfairly refuses to arbitrate an employee's grievance in the first instance in violation of its duty of fair representation, thereby resulting in a need to arbitrate the dispute.
12. 386 U.S. at 196. 13.
District of Columbia Senior Circuit Judge Harry T Edwards, a former labor law professor and labor arbitrator, Professor Samuel Estreicher, Professor Martin H. Malin, and a handful of others, have recognized that routinely awarding unfairly represented
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courts 4 who routinely seek to fashion a monetary damage remedy in order put the injured plaintiff in the position he or she would have been had the union not breached its duty of fair representation. REv. 127, 182 n.240 (1992) .
Indeed, most of the leading scholarly commentary concerning union liability for breach of the duty of fair representation does not even discuss re-arbitration as a potential remedy, but rather presumes the norm of monetary damages as a remedy. REv. 1211 REv. (1985 (criticizing duty of fair representation jurisprudence, but making no mention of the failure of courts to order re-arbitration as a remedy where a breach of the duty of fair representation is found).
14.
In hybrid actions alleging the employer's breach of contract (the collective bargaining agreement) and the union's breach of the duty of fair representation, re-arbitration is often not even considered by courts as a remedy. REv. 1310 REv. , 1324 REv. (1977 (noting that "[w] hen an individual has succeeded in proving that he was inadequately represented by the union, courts following Vaca have generally adjudicated the merits of the underlying grievance rather than ordering the dispute to arbitration"); LABOR UNION LAW AND REGU-LATION, supra note 1, at 396 ("[Clourts have rarely directed the employer and union to arbitrate a grievance.").
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The current practice of most courts in plenary actions-to simply award monetary damages when the duty of fair representation is breached-does not serve the public interest. Instead, it effectively feeds unions' fear of lawsuits by encouraging them to bring useless grievances in order to avoid the potential of a costly lawsuit. Litigation is particularly undesired by unions as well as by employers who, in the course of defending such lawsuits, are placed into a quasi-type of co-counsel arrangement to respond to the union member plaintiffs allegations.' 5 Although a breach of the duty of fair representation can occur in a variety of different factual situations, this Article focuses on the most common form-where the union refuses to take a grievance to arbitration or handles arbitration in a perfunctory manner. This Article primarily addresses court litigation and not duty of fair representation claims before the National Labor Relations Board.' 6 Part Two of this Article explores the development of the duty of fair representation and provides a synoptic review of current law. Part Three demonstrates the flawed nature of duty of fair representation jurisprudence. Part Four asserts that the adjudication of duty of fair representation claims needs to be moved from the ex-post stage to the ex-ante stage though the adjudication of such disputes in internal union review tribunals. Part Five then explains that rearbitration should become a presumptive remedy in duty of fair representation cases. Finally, this Article concludes by summarizing the need for jurisprudential reform in duty of fair representation litigation and how this Article's modest proposals are consistent with existing labor policy.
15.
In duty of fair representation cases, employer and union counsel may find themselves cooperating with one another in order to avoid any misunderstandings and to assert a uniform reading of the collective bargaining agreement. Ironically, on the surface this fosters the notion that the union is somehow "in bed" with the employer and not appropriately serving the employees' interests.
16. Duty of fair representation plenary actions can be filed directly in court pursuant to Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. 29 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). The filing of unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation does not toll the statute of limitations with respect to a hybrid plenary action filed in court. Arriaga-Zayas v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers Union, 835 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 1987 Steele, a black employee sought to set aside a collectively bargained seniority system which overtly discriminated against black workers who were also union members. The Court found inherent in the Railway Labor Act a duty of bargaining representatives "to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them., 2 8
There being no federal agency to enforce rights under the Railway Labor Act, 29 the Court concluded that this type of claim could be enforced in federal court by damages as well as by awarding appropriate 24.
I have also previously analyzed the lack of an individual right to pursue claims under a collective bargaining agreement and the issue of union member standing to assert a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty to represent non-union members of the craft, at least to the extent of not discriminating against them as such in the contracts which it makes as their representative, the minority would be left with no means of protecting their interests.... The fair interpretation of the statutory language is that the organization chosen to represent a craft is to represent all its members, the majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for and not against those whom it represents. It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for whom it is exercised unless so expressed.
Id. at 201-02.
In recognizing what became known as the duty of fair representation, the Court also drew upon a constitutional law analogy. Specifically, the court reasoned that unions have "at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members of the [unit] as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates." Id. at 202; see also Harper & Lupu, supra note 13 (discussing development of the duty of fair representation and arguing that equal protection doctrine should provide the normative underpinnings for the duty of fair representation jurisprudence).
29. See id. at 186. The holding that the duty of fair representation stems from a union's authorization to represent employees exclusively under Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C § 159(a) (2006) , is an important concept because not all private employers are subject to the National Labor Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act. For example, under Section 14(c) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has discretion to decline jurisdiction where the effect on commerce is not substantial. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) B. 375, 387 (1998) .
42.
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 183. The Supreme Court has stated that the duty of fair representation in the unfair labor practice context resembles hybrid court actions "and indeed there is a substantial overlap." DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 170 (1983) ; see also Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 6, 493 U.S. 67, 83-84 (1989) (discussing relationship between duty of fair representation unfair labor practices and plenary actions filed in court). The Board has also recognized the resemblance, but has indicated that NLRB proceedings are "not precisely parallel" to court proceedings. Iron Workers, 326 N.L.R.B. at 377 n.15. This is because the employer is not typically a party and the Board does not always have jurisdiction to decide the breach of contract issue. Id.; cf.Jacoby v. NLRB, 325 F.3d 301, 307-08 (D.C. Cir. 2003 ) (finding the court not required to give NLRB precedent any weight with respect to duty of fair representation claims initiated by a lawsuit).
43.
At first blush, it may seem that permitting employees to file an unfair representation claim in court without at least first having to proceed before the Board is out of step with the movement in this country towards alternative forms of dispute resolution and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. However, in other aspects of employment law it is common for putative plaintiffs to have multiple forums to choose from. For example, a plaintiff alleging racial discrimination can first proceed under Title VII administratively or he or she could choose to litigate that same issue under state law via an administrative agency or, in some cases, directly in state court. See Samuel Estreicher & Michael Harper, CASES AND MA-TERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 1052 (3d ed. 2008).
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also held that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction in duty of fair representation cases.4
Under Vaca, an individual employee does not have a right to present even a meritorious grievance to a labor arbitrator. Nonetheless, recognizing the wide latitude that unions have to enforce their collective bargaining agreements, the Court held that unions could not simply ignore meritorious grievances. 45 Vaca also indicated that a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative contractual remedies before proceeding with a claim in court that the union breached its duty of fair representation. 46 Very significantly, Vaca also addressed remedies for a breach of the duty of fair representation. Specifically, the Court held:
The appropriate remedy for a breach of a union's duty of fair representation must vary with the circumstances of the particular breach.
Petitioners urge that an employee be restricted in such circumstances to a decree compelling the employer and the union to arbitrate the underlying grievance. It is true that the employee's action is based on the employer's alleged breach of contract plus the union's alleged wrongful failure to afford him his contractual remedy of arbitration. For this reason, an order compelling arbitration should be viewed as one of the available remedies when a breach of duty is proved. But we see no reason inflexibly to require arbitration in all cases. In some cases, for example, at least part of the employee's damages may be attributable to the union's breach of duty, and an arbitrator may have no power under the bargaining agreement to award such damages against the union. In other cases, the arbitrable issues may be substantially resolved in the course of trying the fair representation controversy. In such situations, the court should be free to decide the contractual claim and to award the employee appropriate damages or equitable relief. Id. at 185.
47.
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 195-96 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The remedies that the NLRB may award when it finds that a union committed an unfair labor practice by breaching its duty of fair representation are a bit different than court awards in plenary [VOL. 42:3 SPRING 2009] 
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The Supreme Court later held that a plaintiff could sue its employer for breach of contract, its union for breach of the duty of fair representation, or both;" that a plaintiff in such a suit has the right to a trial by jury; 49 that damages must be apportioned according to the degree of fault; 50 that punitive damages are not representation would remove finality from any prior arbitration determination. 5 In 1983, in DelCostello v. Teamsters, the Supreme Court further commented on the nature of duty of fair representation actions. Specifically, the Court stated that the employer's breach of the collective bargaining agreement and the union's breach of the duty of fair representation were two separate claims which were "inextricably hybrid actions. In cases where a union has unfairly refused to pursue a grievance or an arbitration, the Board issues a remedial order which mandates that the union request that the employer promptly consider the grievance, and if it agrees to do so, to process it and permit the unfairly represented employee to be represented by a private attorney, at the union's expense, in the grievance and/or arbitration hearing. In the event that it is not possible to pursue a grievance or arbitration and if the General Counsel is able to show that a timely pursed grievance would have been successful, then the union is responsible for any increases in damages suffered as a consequence of its refusal to process a grievance. Thus, the union is only responsible for its share of the damages. The unfairly represented member would have to sue the employer in court to obtain damages from the employer. See Iron Workers, 326 N.L.R.B at 379. This raises a whole host of issues concerning NLRB remedies in duty of fair representation cases which are left for another day.
48. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983) . As a practical matter, in hybrid duty of fair representation lawsuits, plaintiffs sue employers and unions simultaneously. Although an employee may have a claim against the union because of the way a grievance was handled, it is the employer who took the action against the employee in the first place. Additionally, if reinstatement is sought, unions obviously cannot award this remedy. See Comment, Employee Challenges To Arbitral Awards, supra note 14, at 1312-13 n.10; accordBreininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 6, 493 U.S. 69, 80 (1989) interdependent. , 7 The plaintiff employee files what is commonly referred to as a hybrid claim for breach of the duty of fair representation and breach of contract claim against the employer, the union, or both. 5s To prevail, however, a plaintiff must establish both a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union and a breach of contract by the employer. 59 In order to determine if a breach of the duty of fair representation occurred, each part of the Vaca tripartite standard-breach requires that union action be arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith-must be analyzed separately. Under Vaca, a union's actions are considered arbitrary if they are so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be considered irrational. 6 A union's actions are deemed arbitrary if they fail to take a basic and required step under the collective bargaining agreement. 6 Union action, or lack thereof, may also be "arbitrary" if it results in an "egregious disregard for the rights of union members.", 3 The wide range of discretion conferred upon unions allows them to make discretion- 
own interest, rather than that of the union member, it is considered bad faith.6' To establish discrimination, a plaintiff must show animus on behalf of the union and that the plaintiff was treated 67 differently than others.
Under the Vaca standard, courts do not second guess a union's decision not to pursue arbitration.
8 Stated another way, courts will not substitute their 'judgment for that of the union, even [when] with the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the union could have made a better call.
6 9 A union's tactical decisions, therefore, are essentially immune from challenge unless they are "so egregious, so far short of minimum standards of fairness to the employee and so unrelated to legitimate union interests as to be arbitrary." 70 Quite simply, union representation does not have to be error free."' Even where a plaintiff manages to meet this burden, a substantial body of case law requires that a plaintiff additionally establish that the breach "seriously undermined" the grievance process. The individual in question must also have suffered some type of injury. 403, 405 (6th Cir. 1994) . As the Seventh Circuit succinctly stated:
In order to prevail on this claim, in addition to showing that the union acted arbitrarily, Matthews must also establish that he "was actually harmed by the union's actions" and that "the outcome of the [grievance] [VOL. 42:3
ing agreement differently from individual employees. When this occurs, litigation may follow.
Significantly, however, duty of fair representation jurisprudence is a product of judge-made common law. 79 Therefore, this body of law is subject to change and revision, a subject to which this Article turns next.
III. THE FLAWED NATURE OF EXISTING DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION JURISPRUDENCE
Notwithstanding the heightened standard of judicial deference in duty of fair representation cases, unions are often fearful of such suits. 8° That fear sometimes causes unions to file grievances which they know lack merit because they believe that it is simply easier to file the grievance than to deal with a potential plaintiff. After all, the employee is a union member who, in some cases, may have been supporting the union in other matters for years. Also, while Cir. 2003) , where a union member read faculty tenure and review provisions differently from defendant union). Indeed, the First Circuit affirmed a lower court's statement that:
[T] here's no duty of fair representation to go to bat for any particular pilot because that pilot is bellyaching about getting less pay. That's the contract. And the union is supposed to try and negotiate the best contract it can negotiate. So once the contract's negotiated the fact that this or that person doesn't like the way it works, thinks that their interests aren't adequately represented, there's no lawsuit. No lawsuit because that's worked out by the democracy within the union .... 80. There are no empirical studies concerning just how widespread this union fear is. As a practical matter, such a study may be impossible because researchers cannot quantify what the subjective term "fear" means. Parties may also be reluctant to admit that they are fearful of litigation. It has been well recognized, however, in the legal literature, that unions are fearful of duty of fair representation lawsuits and, as a result, often process unmeritorious grievances. 
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arbitration does not come cheap,"' it is considerably less costly than litigation.
While at first blush, such a practice seems at odds with traditional notions of modern day litigation and the ever present possibility of sanctions, that is not the case in labor law. A union acting in this manner would be consistent-or at least not inconsistent-with Supreme Court dicta which indicates that unions may process frivolous claims due to their potential "therapeutic value" in labor relations. Sometimes unions must "fight the good fight" in order to try to do something to alleviate the problem at issue. It is no secret to labor relations professionals that unions have internal political needs. Of course, employers often have political agendas of their own."' A union's fear is somewhat understandable given the fact that the plaintiff in a duty of fair representation suit is entitled to a jury trial. 8 4 Juries may not be familiar with labor management relations or worse yet, be outright hostile to unions. In a lawsuit, the union always faces the possibility of being found responsible for a portion of back pay, future loses, compensatory damages and/or attorneys' fees. 5 Some courts have also awarded damages for emotional dis- Even fighting a losing war can have some benefit in labor relations. The fact that an employer knows that it will have a "fight" on its hands may cause it to stop and think before taking a similar type of action in the future. Additionally, the arbitral issue can become a "rallying cause" for the union and can eventually lead to certain modifications to the collective bargaining agreement.
The In none of these cases was the possibility of re-arbitration considered as a remedy or as part of a remedy.
9 " Under the current system, plaintiffs also have a choice of forum. They can litigate in court or can file an administrative charge with the NLRB, with or without an attorney. 9 3 The fact that there are two routes compounds the fear in the system because laymen may not understand the difference between these two forums.
In plenary actions, few plaintiffs would be satisfied by merely filing a lawsuit seeking re-arbitration. If they are going to go through the time, expense and trouble of litigation, they are going to shoot for the stars and seek a large damage award. Of course, plaintiffs will need to pay their lawyer, who may or may not have been retained on a contingency fee basis.
86.
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 2083-85 (collecting cases and noting that courts are in conflict with respect to awarding damages for emotional distress).
87.
Ann 92. There are, of course, many other examples. In 1998, a union was held responsible for more than $22,000 as its share of responsibility due to the perfunctory processing of a discharge arbitration. Webb v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 1230, 1237 n.9 (10th Cir. 1998) . A union was found responsible for $26,000 in 1996 due to its failure to properly present a grievance. Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502 , 1508 (9th Cir. 1986 ).
93.
See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing duty of fair representation claims under the NLRA).
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The practice of most plaintiffs of simply filing actions for monetary damages is understandable in that Vaca did not mandate that re-arbitration be the only remedy. What was not predictable, however, was that the courts and the defendant union bar would entirely overlook re-arbitration as a potential remedy. The Vaca decision is now over forty years old and part of settled law.1 4 However, due to the lack of consideration paid to re-arbitration as a remedy, one must question how many litigators and jurists have actually read the Vaca decision since law school.
As discussed in Part Five of this Article, re-arbitration should be a presumptive remedy where a breach of the duty of fair representation is found due to the failure of a union to pursue a grievance. However, it is first necessary to explain how and why duty of fair representation complaints should and could be moved out of the court system.
IV. THE ADJUDICATION OF DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
DISPUTES NEEDS TO BE MOVED FROM THE Ex-POST STAGE (AFTER A COURT DISPUTE HAS ARISEN) TO THE EX-ANTE
STATE (BEFORE A COURT DISPUTE HAS ARISEN)
Duty of fair representation litigation often arises because individual union members have no right to arbitrate grievances under a collective bargaining agreement between the union and the employer. 9
5 If a union refuses to arbitrate or advocate a certain position that a bargaining unit member wants to advocate, hostility can develop. Hostility, in turn, breeds litigation. Therefore, any reform of duty of fair representation jurisprudence needs to recognize this inherent conflict.
Any proposal to modify duty of fair representation jurisprudence also needs to be realistic. Labor law issues are often highly political and emotional. It is not always only about the money; sometimes, one side or the other really wants to make a point.
Unfortunately, it is no secret to most labor law practitioners and labor law scholars that American labor law is badly in need of re- 
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proposals to modify duty of fair representation jurisprudence.
9 As a result, an examination or re-examination of the case law is necessary. Significantly, the duty of fair representation was judicially created and therefore, it can be judicially modified and extended.
Like most litigation, duty of fair representation jurisprudence has been driven by ex-post disputes. However, it can literally take years for a court to decide a dispute. Time is of critical importance in labor law. The employee may be out of a job and emotions run high. At that point, the unfairly represented employee is likely to seek all that he can in the form of monetary damages. As a result, waiting for a court award is not necessarily in the best interest of any party, the process, or public policy. If the dispute can be resolved quicker and in a less costly manner outside the formal court system, all parties may be better off.
A. Union Internal Review Tribunals As a Defense In Duty of Fair Representation Litigation
Current law requires that union members exhaust internal union procedures before they are permitted to bring a duty of fair representation action in court. As explained below, such internal union procedures could constitute a complete defense to duty of fair representation complaints, provided that the system adopted is fair and regular. To be effective, this tribunal review system must also have the authority to award a plaintiff full relief.
Many unions 9s have employed various types of internal review processes 9 9 which provide disgruntled union members with an opportunity to challenge union decisions, such as the decision not to file a grievance or demand arbitration. As a result, a significant body of law related to internal union tribunals has developed.
The Supreme Court ruled that before an employee can bring an action against an employer for an alleged breach of a collective bargaining contract, he or she must first exhaust any grievance and arbitration procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.' 0° In Clayton v. UAW,' 0 ' the Supreme Court extended this exhaustion principle to duty of fair representation claims.' 0 2
In Clayton, after an employee was dismissed he asked his union to file a grievance, which it initially did, but the union ultimately refused to proceed to arbitration. Plaintiff was notified of this deci-
98.
The UAW has had an internal procedure since 1957 which allows union members to appeal grievances which the union has denied and additionally has successfully negotiated into many collective bargaining agreements the ability to revive grievances where a breach of duty is found. Malin, supra note 13, at 180 n.230; see e.g., Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 682-83 (1981) 650, 652-53 (1965) . Interestingly, the requirement that plaintiffs must exhaust internal review processes has been extended to the non-union workplace where a plaintiff was subject to a grievance procedure contained in an employee handbook. SeeNeiman v. Yale Univ., 851 A. [VOL. 42:3
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sion after the time for demanding arbitration had expired. The United Auto Workers constitution mandated that members first exhaust internal union appeal procedures before seeking redress in court.1 0 3 Plaintiff Clayton did not timely file an internal appeal from the local union's decision not to arbitrate. Instead, plaintiff filed a hybrid action in federal court under Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 0 4 alleging that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement by discharging him without just cause and that the union violated its duty of fair representation by arbitrarily refusing to arbitrate.
The Court approved of lower courts exercising their discretion to require exhaustion where employees could get full relief. As the Court stated:
In exercising this discretion, at least three factors should be relevant: first, whether union officials are so hostile to the employee that he could not hope to obtain a fair hearing on his claim; second, whether the internal union appeals procedures would be inadequate either to reactivate the employee's grievance or to award him the full relief he seeks under § 301; and third, whether exhaustion of internal procedures would unreasonably delay the employee's opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his claim. If any of these factors are found to exist, the court may properly excuse the employee's failure to exhaust.
Where internal union appeals procedures can result in either complete relief to an aggrieved employee or reactivation of his grievance, exhaustion would advance the national labor policy of encouraging private resolution of contractual labor disputes.'05 103. These internal procedures required that the member first seek relief from the membership of his or her local and if the member was not satisfied, he or she could further appeal to the International Executive Board, and finally, to either the Constitutional Convention Appeals Committee or to a Public Review Board composed of "impartial persons of good public repute" who were not members of the UAW. Clayton, 451 U.S. at 683. 
1981).
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Ultimately, the Court held that the plaintiff did not have to exhaust his administrative remedies by going through the UAW's internal appeal process because the relief available under that process was inadequate. Specifically, the UAW appeal process did not include the authority to award reinstatement, which was one of the remedies plaintiff was seeking."' 6 In a footnote, the Court also recognized that if the collective bargaining agreement permitted an untimely grievance to go forward, the plaintiff would have the duty to exhaust internal union remedies.'°7 In another footnote, the Court recognized that if such cases could go forward, a union might be able to rectify the very wrong that the employee complained about-the failure to file a grievance.' 8 The UAW later took advantage of the language in the Court's footnotes. Shortly after Clayton was decided, the UAW was able to correct the deficiencies with its internal review process. The union secured agreements from a number of employers that permitted the reactivation of otherwise time-barred grievances where the UAW internal tribunal determined whether the union breached its duty of fair representation.'0°I f the employer is unwilling to let an otherwise time-barred grievance go forward, existing law permits an unfairly represented employee to have his grievance or arbitration processed if the plaintiff has established a breach of the duty of fair representation, irrespective of the time limits set forth in the collective bargaining 106. This decision would not be remarkable except for the fact that the UAW's appeal process also included the ability to award back pay. Clayton, 451 U.S. at 690. If this case were brought today with a plaintiff only seeking monetary damages, the result may have been different because the union's internal tribunal would have the authority to award the full relief requested. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (discussing how most plaintiffs today only seek money damages as a remedy for a breach of the duty of fair representation).
As the Court stated:
If a provision in the collective-bargaining agreement also permits reactivation of a grievance after an internal union appeal, an employer or union should also be able to rely on that provision and thus defend the § 301 suit on the ground that the employee failed to exhaust internal union procedures.
Clayton, 451 U.S. at 692 n.20. 108. Id. at 693 n.21.
ST. ANTOINE ET AL.
, supra note 1, at 846; see, e.g., Monroe v. UAW, 723 F.2d 22, 24 (6th Cir. 1983 ). Union review of internal decisions not to arbitrate relate to internal union affairs, and as such, are not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 1383-85 (internal union affairs are permissive subjects of bargaining). Therefore, an employer cannot compel a union to adopt an internal tribunal review process. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 1, at 511-46 (distinguishing between mandatory, permissive and illegal subjects of collective bargaining).
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agreement."° In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.," the Court held that a union's breach of its duty of fair representation removed the finality from any prior arbitration award. As the Court reasoned:
[I] t is urged that when the procedures have been followed and a decision favorable to the employer announced, the employer must be protected from relitigation by the express contractual provision declaring a decision to be final and binding. We disagree. The union's breach of duty relieves the employee of an express or implied requirement that disputes be settled through contractual grievance procedures; if it seriously undermines the integrity of the arbitral process the union's breach also removes the bar of the finality provisions of the contract. Later in the opinion, the Court also stated that it made no difference at which point of the grievance procedure the union breached its duty of fair representation.' 3 Thus, Clayton and Hines, read together, reasonably stand for the propositions that: 1) an aggrieved union member must exhaust any internal review processes employed by the union if complete relief could be obtained; and 2) if a court finds a breach of the duty of fair representation, time limits contained in the collective bargaining agreement may be set aside. In that way, a case could be arbitrated notwithstanding the nominal contractual time limits contained in the collective bargaining agreement.
If this result could be compelled where internal union review tribunals are utilized, it would move the resolution of duty of fair representation disputes from the ex-post stage (after a court dispute has arisen) to the ex-ante stage (before a court dispute has arisen) and further public policy aims by removing such disputes from the court system. Removing these claims from the courts would also relieve tension between employees and their union as 111. 424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976) . 112. Id.
As the Court stated:
To us it makes little difference whether the union subverts the arbitration process by refusing to proceed as in Vaca or follows the arbitration trail to the end, but in so doing subverts the arbitration process by failing to fairly represent the employee. In neither case, does the employee receive fair representation.
Id. at 572 (quoting Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179, 180 (9th Cir. 1974)).
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union members would have an opportunity to be heard without having to file a lawsuit. However, there are at least four significant and inter-related issues that accompany mandating the use of internal union review tribunals. First, significant issues may arise concerning the appropriate standards that these internal union tribunals must follow. Second, legal issues may arise because unlike existing jurisprudence, there would be no adjudication by a court. Third, there may be timing problems as the statute of limitations to file a grievance may expire before the internal union review process is complete. Finally, employers may find permitting union officials to apportion damages problematic.
Union Internal Review Tribunal Standards
Undoubtedly, having union tribunals determine whether the union has breached its duty of fair representation is somewhat awkward. Nevertheless, existing duty of fair representation jurisprudence provides support for this concept and is instructive for determining how internal union tribunals should be constituted. For example, if the union member were able to show extreme hostility at the local and international level, exhaustion of the union's internal appeal process would not be required.
1 4 Additionally, the standards outlined in Clayton provide useful criteria to determine whether or not the union tribunal internal review system is valid. Thus, if the internal union tribunal system is a sham or procedurally irregular, a duty of fair representation lawsuit would be permitted to proceed in court.
The concept of allowing unions to establish internal review tribunals has precedence in labor law beyond just the NLRA. Under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA")," 6 union members are entitled to a trial before an in-114. See, e.g., LaPerriere v. UAW, 348 F.3d 127, 131 (6th Cir. 2003 ) (upholding $165,000 damage action against union for failing to grieve discharge and rejecting defense that plaintiff failed to exhaust his internal union remedies because plaintiff established hostility on the part of his local union as well as the international union). Hostility at the local union level does not excuse the failure to exhaust if a further appeal can be heard at the international union level. [VOL. 42:3
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ternal union trial board if they contest the imposition of internal union discipline, such as a fine for crossing a picket line. Some of the lessons learned from those hearing tribunals can be applied to union internal duty of fair representation tribunals. The LMRDA requires that employees have the opportunity to be heard. LMRDA decisions from the internal union tribunal do not have to be made by an independent outside decision maker."' While the trial board which hears and decides such cases cannot be biased, the tribunal does not have to be entirely composed of neutrals-in the classic sense of an outside arbitrator, or professor who acts as a quasi-judge. The decision-makers must merely be neutral in the sense that they are not involved in the dispute. Decision-makers may, however, be union officials." 8 Of course, it might be in the union's interest to retain professional neutrals such as arbitrators or professors who review these types of cases to avoid any claim of collusion. Additionally, review by a professional neutral may help insulate the union against claims of discrimination or other types of litigation it may face. Use of a neutral may also facilitate employer cooperation. This is because employers are more likely to have confidence in a system where neutrals make determinations that can affect them. Whether the union decides to retain such a neutral is simply an internal business decision.
As maintained by this Article, both the use of a valid internal union tribunal or the failure of a union member to utilize such a review system should constitute a complete defense to duty of fair representation claims. The review system adopted by the union, however, must be legitimate. 19 At a minimum, the Union should have the obligation to inform the member about the internal tribunal review process so that he or she has the opportunity to utilize it.' 20 Union members should also have the right to appear with counsel or with another employee. This will contribute to the legitimacy of the tribunal and provide the employee with an opportunity to be heard while expressing his or her arguments in an organized and professional manner. Preferably, two levels of internal appeal could be instituted as in Clayton.
Of course, as under existing law, an employee would retain the right to appeal from the decision of the union internal tribunal. However, the scope of judicial review would be very narrow. A court would only examine whether or not the tribunal followed its own rules and procedures and provided a fair and regular process. Otherwise, if a more searching review were provided, court's would become entangled in something akin to an arbitral dispute because the court would be put in the position of reviewing the merits of the dispute in question.
The Problems Caused Because There Will Be
No Court Adjudication of Liability Significantly, in both Clayton and Hines there was a court determination of liability. If union internal review tribunals are to be mandated, as argued in this Article, there would be no judicial determination. Clayton and Hines would have to be extended to provide a complete defense to the duty of fair representation if the tribunal, as opposed to a court, decides whether the union breached its duty of fair representation.
This issue has not been be litigated. However, in labor law, it is appropriate to look to other similar statutes for guidance. 2 501 F.2d 179, 180 (9th Cir. 1974) ; Bianchi v. Roadway Express, Inc., 441 F.3d 1278 , 1282 (11th Cir. 2006 ). The same standard should apply to any internal review system that a union may adopt.
120. Remarkably, under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401, many courts have held that unions do not have an affirmative duty to inform members of internal union appeal processes reasoning that it is the employee's affirmative duty to inquire about such processes and ignorance of the law, so to speak, is no defense. Hammer v. UAW, 178 E3d 856,858 (7th Cir. 1999 note 1, at 336 (collecting authorities holding same).
The better reasoned view, however, is that unions must inform employees of the process, if the union is going to rely on this process as an affirmative defense to any fair representation claim. See, e.g., Maddalone, 152 F.3d at 186.
121. As I have previously recognized, courts adjudicating labor and employment claims under various labor and employment statutes often look to other employment cases for [VOL. 42:3 SPRING 2009] 
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Fortunately, present day employment discrimination jurisprudence supports the extension of Clayton and Hines in a manner which provides such tribunals with the authority to determine whether a breach of the duty of fair representation occurred.
In 122. 524 U.S. 742 (1998) . 123. 524 U.S. 775 (1998) . Ellerth was decided by the Supreme Court the same day as Faragher. In Ellerth, the Court adopted the same standard of employer vicarious liability as in 125. Specifically, the Supreme Court explained an employer's responsibility for sexual harassment as follows:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the defense.
Elerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
cases is irrelevant and therefore, this would not be a basis to distinguish those cases.
Ellerth and Faragher together with Clayton and Hines support the proposition that union internal review tribunals should be able to make a binding determination with respect to whether a breach of the duty of fair representation occurred notwithstanding the lack of court review. Certainly, no provision of law prevents authorizing union internal review tribunals with the authority to make such determinations. If union internal review tribunals are given this authority, resort to that process could be compelled and this process would constitute a complete defense to any duty of fair representation claim filed later in court by an employee who failed to exhaust this remedy.
The Statute of Limitations Problem
Even if a court judgment of liability is not necessary, the use of internal union review tribunals may present statute of limitations issues with respect to the processing of what would otherwise likely be an untimely grievance. By the time the internal union tribunal would have made its decision, the time frame to file a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement would likely have expired. 26 Without cooperation from the employer, an untimely grievance will be barred. Therefore, this Article also proposes that union internal review tribunals be given the authority to set aside the time limits of the collective bargaining agreement when they find that the union breached its duty of fair representation. While existing law does not require that the collective bargaining grievance time limits be set aside, it is submitted that nothing in existing law prohibits this proposal from being adopted. This approach is simply an extension of Clayton and Hines and must necessarily be super-imposed in order to afford union members complete relief. From a policy perspective, it appears to be an unfair burden to require that union members litigate claims in court simply because an arbitrary grievance and arbitration timetable was negotiated. After all, collective bargaining agreements are not statutes. They are contracts, to which the individual employee is not even a party.
Authorizing these internal union tribunals to set aside statutes of limitations that may be nominally included in a collective bargain-126. A typical collective bargaining agreement contains a 30 day period to file a grievance. I refer to this period as a statute of limitation.
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ing agreement is entirely consistent with the notion that these tribunals be given the authority to decide the dispute in the first instance. Indeed, the authority to set aside arbitral time limits must go hand and hand with mandating an extension of Clayton and Hines to require duty of fair representation plaintiffs to utilize union internal review tribunals. Unions and employers may voluntarily choose to include language in their collective bargaining agreements permitting such nominally untimely grievances to go forward, and thereby make litigation less likely.
2 8 Absent agreement, Hines would have to be extended to grant internal union tribunals the power to ignore collective bargaining agreement statute of limitations where a breach of the duty of fair representation is found. This is similar to removing the finality from an arbitration decision due to a duty of fair representation breach as was done in Hines.
4.The Problem With Apportionment of Damages
As noted, plaintiffs routinely seek monetary damages in duty of fair representation cases.
2 9 Therefore, to be successful, internal review tribunals should have the authority to award plaintiffs monetary relief. Though uncommon, some union tribunals already have this authority.
3 0 Existing law only requires court apportionment of damages after a court determines that a union has breached its duty of fair representation. Again, having the union decide such issues may appear awkward to some. Significantly, however, nothing in existing law prevents unions from granting internal tribunals the authority to apportion liability according to the degree of fault just as a court would.
3 ' Again, courts could simply extend existing jurisprudence to validate this authority. Cir. 1999) , where a disgruntled union member's duty of fair representation claim was dismissed due to the plaintiffs failure to exhaust internal union remedies. His fair representation claim sought money damages which the union internal review process had the authority to award.
131. When a breach of the duty of fair representation is found, damages are apportioned between the employer and the union according to the degree of fault. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1983) .
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the argument that a judicially found breach of the duty of fair representation is not necessary.
The system would work more smoothly if employers and unions could agree to be bound by such decisions. However, obtaining the employers' consent to be bound by the decision of a union internal tribunal may be difficult. Employers may fear that unions would place excessive liability on them. However, it is in the union's interest to administer these tribunals fairly. The goal would be to obtain employer cooperation. Nonetheless, it is recognized that some employers may refuse to cooperate if these tribunals have the authority to award monetary damages.
At the very least, suspicious employers should give this proposal a chance to work. The upside potential is the virtual elimination of duty of fair representation litigation. The downside, of course, is that unions may impose an unfair degree of blame on the employer. The internal union tribunal decision would still be binding if it fully compensates the plaintiff. There is, however, a practical solution to this problem. If re-arbitration becomes a presumptive remedy as is argued next, then the issue of the award of monetary damages is no longer so problematic. With re-arbitration, neither the employer nor the union face the specter of a monetary damage award from the union internal review tribunal.
V. RE-ARBITRATION AS A PRESUMPTIVE REMEDY
Not all unions are going to adopt internal review tribunals. Thus, a class of duty of fair representation cases may remain before the courts to adjudicate in the first instance. In those cases, and even if none of the proposals outlined in Part Four are adopted, rearbitration should be the presumptive remedy where a breach of the duty of fair representation is found due to a union's failure to arbitrate.
In Vaca, the Supreme Court held that "[t] he appropriate remedy for a breach of a union's duty of fair representation must vary with the circumstances of the particular breach" and that "an order compelling arbitration should be viewed as one of the available remedies when a breach of duty is proved.', 3 2 Professor Martin H.
Malin, a well known labor law scholar, has described this part of duty of fair representation jurisprudence as "Vaca's forgotten alter- [VOL. 42:3
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native.", 3 3 Nevertheless, re-arbitration remains a viable remedy which courts should adopt. 134 The practice of courts in simply awarding monetary damages when a breach of the duty of fair representation is found does not comport with labor law principles which have followed a "hands off' approach to the decisions of labor arbitrators who are charged with the responsibility to determine whether a collective bargaining agreement has been violated and issuing an appropriate remedy in the form of an arbitration award.' 35 The whole idea of labor arbitration is that courts should stay out of labor disputes and that disputes under collective bargaining agreements are to be resolved by arbitrators who, as described by Professor Theodore St. Antoine in his classic work more than three decades ago, function as readers of collective bargaining agreements for the parties. Arbitration has a rich history in this county as being considered part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.1 3 7 Yet, if an unfairly represented employee is permitted to side-step arbitration and receive monetary damages, the collective bargaining grievance and arbitration process is not being fully respected. As Senior D.C. Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards, a former accomplished labor arbitrator and full time law professor, has stated with regard to duty of fair representation jurisprudence:
[I] t seems that the courts have ignored the federal labor policy of nonintervention in the arbitral process and have proceeded wholesale to decide the merits of the underlying grievances rather than returning the cases to arbitration. I am of the view that this practice not only alters the parties' bargain but threatens havoc with labor contract administration.
8
Judge Edwards asserts that the remedy for a violation of employer and employee collectively bargained rules must be provided by the collective agreement itself, not notions of public law or policy that courts administer because those principles are external to the collective bargaining process. Judge Edwards maintains that it is the function of the labor arbitrator and not a judge to say what a labor contract means. 139 Professor Martin H. Malin's views are largely in accord with those of Judge Edwards.
4 0 The failure of courts to recognize rearbitration as a remedy has the potential to undermine labor policy because courts are being placed in the position of having to interpret a collective bargaining agreement. As Professor Malin states:
Today, if a court finds a DFR breach, the underlying breach of contract claim will be heard by a jury if the plaintiff demanded a jury trial, and there will be a judicial apportionment of back pay damages between employer and union. The employer, no matter how blameless, cannot rely on the grievance procedure to avoid judicial determination of the grievance, even if the employer already has succeeded in arbitration.
137. St. Antoine, supra note 136; accord Malin, supra note 13 at 174 (stating that " [a] rbitration, however, is a continuation of the collective bargaining process.").
138. Edwards, supra note 13, at 101. [VOL. 42:3
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The typical DFR case arising out of a union's handling of a discharge grievance illustrates the potential for undermining labor policy regarding grievance arbitration. When an employer agrees that it will only discharge for just cause, it does so recognizing that just cause in any particular case will ultimately be defined by an arbitrator. The parties have agreed that just cause means whatever the arbitrator interprets it to mean .... When because of a DFR breach, a judge or a jury defines just cause, the parties are held to a bargain markedly different from the one to which they originally agreed. Courts should be reluctant to change the basis of the parties' bargain. Under the current state of the law, limiting the DFR's level of accountability also limits judicial rewriting of the parties' bargain. 4 ' Judge Edwards and Professor Malin are not alone. A decade and a half ago, another well-known labor scholar, Professor Samuel Estreicher, argued that duty of fair representation jurisprudence should be changed to trigger re-arbitration as a remedy.1 42 Professor Estreicher additionally recognized that there are limitations with respect to the use of re-arbitration as a remedy. With respect to any interim period where there is a hiatus because of the union's breach of duty, according to Estreicher, the union should be responsible for back pay.
It is submitted that most unions and employers would probably accept such a result. This is because if the matter was litigated, This Article does not go so far as the late Professor Feller and only asserts that rearbitration should be the presumptive remedy in duty of fair representation cases where a breach is found due to the union's failure to arbitrate. ANN. 1101 ANN. (1991 . Courts in the private sector have looked to public-sector employment cases for guidance. See generally Rubinstein, supra note 81, at 437. However, it is recognized that most of the time it is courts in the public sector which are looking to private sector cases for guidance. In most jurisdictions, in the public sector, the duty of fair representation is virtually identical to the private sector. See e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 673 (discussing duty of fair representation under New York public sector labor law). Therefore, it is appropriate for courts in the private sector to look to state public sector duty of fair representation law for guidance. an exception to this general rule which allows an employee to file an action for damages if he can establish that the employer actively participated in the union's bad faith or otherwise conspired with the union to deny the employee rights under the collective bargaining agreement. Dubose, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 416; Kimpflen, supra.
147. As the Court stated:
Our holding that the chancellor lacks authority to resolve the underlying grievance is consistent with ... the strong policy favoring arbitration of public sector grievances.... Moreover, our holding that the Chancellor may, if the employee establishes the union's breach of its duty of fair representation, order arbitration of the underlying grievance nunc po tunc provides the employee with a complete and adequate legal remedy....
Under this procedure, a wrongfully discharged employee receives precisely the treatment all the employees in the unit are entitled to under the collective bargaining agreement.
Martino v. Transp. Workers' Union Local 234, 480 A.2d 242, 251-52 (Pa. 1984) . 148. See supra notes 138-144 and accompanying text. Indeed, this statute has been interpreted by courts in a manner which is consistent with the late Professor David Feller's original view that re-arbitration was the only appropriate remedy where a union refuses to Re-arbitration as a remedy is also supported by existing empirical data which indicates that it does not make much difference whether employees have their cases heard by courts or by arbitrators. The empirical research indicates that plaintiffs do not fare significantly better in arbitration as opposed to litigation. However, it should be noted that the data does not indicate whether the damage amounts are fairer under one system or the other. 49 Re-arbitration, though a rare bird in modern-day private-sector duty of fair representation jurisprudence, has been ordered as a remedy. 50 In Stanton v. Delta Airlines, 5 1 for example, the First Circuit ordered re-arbitration in an opinion written by then First Circuit Chief Judge Stephen Breyer. On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that the lower court erred by ordering re-arbitration because the court should have decided the issue in the first instance. Judge Breyer, writing for a unanimous First Circuit panel, rejected this argument and cited Vaca for the proposition that an order compelling arbitration is one of the available remedies courts may order. Indeed, Judge Breyer rejected the argument that where a breach of duty of fair representation was found, re-arbitration should not be ordered because the union panel members might be hostile toward the union member by virtue of the fact that the individual
